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ABSTRACT 
While naturalistic theories have come to dominate the philosophical landscape, there is still lit-
tle consensus on what “naturalism” means. I trace the origins of contemporary naturalism to a view, 
called the “fundamental naturalistic impulse,” that originates in Quine’s turn against Carnap and which I 
take to be necessary for naturalism. In light of this impulse, some “substantively naturalistic” theories 
are examined: a weak version of non-supernaturalism, Railton’s a posteriori reduction of moral terms, 
and “Canberra plan” conceptual analyses of moral property terms. I suggest that if we take the funda-
mental naturalistic impulse seriously, then there is no need to differentiate substantive versions of natu-
ralism over and above methodological versions. Substantive thesis in ontology or semantics can be had 
on account of one’s methodological commitments. This not only cuts against the distinction between 
methodological and substantive naturalisms, but also demonstrates just how far method can reach. 
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1 INTRODUCTION  
In closing “Naturalism and the A Priori” (2000), Penelope Maddy notes that  “[a]ny discussion of na-
turalism these days is—overtly or covertly—an attempt to define the term” (114).  The current paper is 
not an attempt at a precise definition, for I will not propose a set of individually necessary and jointly 
sufficient conditions for naturalism.  Instead, a glance back at the beginnings of an important source of 
contemporary naturalism in the work of W. V. Quine will serve as a case study in which we can fix upon 
what I take to be an indispensable feature of naturalism: a demand for continuity between philosophy 
and the sciences.   This approach takes a one-level view; philosophical and scientific inquiry takes place 
on a single level, namely the level occupied by the empirical sciences.  As such, there is a marked skep-
ticism about calls to some extra-scientific level of inquiry.  Consider the following characterization from 
Maddy:  
The naturalistic philosopher is the Neurathian sailor, working within science to under-
stand, clarify, and improve science; she will treat philosophical questions on a par with 
other scientific questions, insofar as this is possible; faced with first philosophical de-
mands—that is, questions and solutions that require extra-scientific methods—she will 
respond with befuddlement, for she knows no such methods. (2000: 108) 
 
Clearly, methodological concerns are central to naturalistic philosophy, but method is not exhaustive of 
the naturalist’s efforts.  Like the working scientist, the naturalist confronts the world with her methods 
in hand and seeks to refine and improve them.  But the naturalist is like the working scientist in another 
respect:  she also brings an inherited picture of the world to her inquiries as well.  As Quine remarks:  
The naturalistic philosopher begins his reasoning with the inherited world theory as a 
going concern.  He tentatively believes all of it, but believes also that some unidentified 
portions are wrong.  He tries to improve, clarify and understand the system from within.  
He is the busy sailor adrift on Neurath’s boat. (1975: 72) 
 
Quine’s message here is that the naturalist begins her inquiry with a whole host of inherited beliefs; it is 
then her goal to test and refine her beliefs by applying the methods of the empirical sciences, the most 
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successful methods she knows.  The figure of Neurath’s boat suggests that, counter to some traditional 
philosophical views, we cannot start from scratch.  Rather, our encounter with the world begins with a 
number of tentatively accepted positions: some methodological, some substantive. 
Both substantive and methodological positions are planks in Neurath’s boat; both are pieces of our 
inherited, best-going theory of the world.  If our only successful methods of refining or replacing our 
beliefs are scientific methods, then so-called “metaphysical” beliefs—about what there really is, about 
word-world relations, about truth, etc.—will be, indeed must turn out to be, amenable to the methods 
and practice of the natural sciences.1  This realization is the beginning of eroding the distinction between 
the methodological and the substantive.  The naturalist is born into a particular world-view, replete with 
substantive positions; a pure methodological naturalism can only be had in the cloister. 
In arguing for this conclusion—that naturalism is an approach to doing philosophy that contains 
both methodological and substantive commitments—it is first necessary to take a look at the history of 
naturalism in hopes of narrowing down the term a bit. The locus classicus of contemporary naturalism is 
found in the work of Quine, especially in his reaction to the views of his teacher and mentor Rudolph 
Carnap.  The first section of this essay will recount their debate and note that Quine’s naturalistic turn 
against Carnap is fundamentally characterized by the repudiation of any other level of inquiry apart 
from the level of the empirical sciences. Following Maddy (2001), I will call this view the fundamental 
naturalistic impulse. 
Having fixed a core feature of naturalism, in section II I will turn to a popular contemporary tax-
onomy of philosophical naturalisms prominently represented by Peter Railton and Brian Leiter.  Accord-
ing to this view, methodological and substantive naturalistic positions are distinct: one can be a metho-
                                                          
1
 I do not intend this remark to be positivistic in character, such that  purported “metaphysical” questions like “Is 
everything physical?” are translatable into a sense-data vocabulary.  The foregoing remark is meant instead to high-
light the one-level view of the naturalist.  Purported metaphysical questions are internal to the sciences; they do not 
fall outside of the grasp of scientific methodology.  For instance, we will see in section III that the naturalist under 
consideration treats ontological theses as high-level empirical hypotheses, thus they are adjudicated by appeal to 
theoretical criteria. 
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dological naturalist while abstaining from any substantive views, or one can be a substantive naturalist 
while rejecting naturalistic methodology.  In section III I show, contra Railton and Leiter, that acceptance 
of methodological naturalism in fact entails the acceptance of some substantive positions: first with re-
spect to ontological naturalism (concerning what kind of entities exist) and then with respect to seman-
tic naturalism (which concerns the relationships between vocabularies—here, between descriptive and 
ethical vocabularies).  The general strategy in these sections is to show that, given the fundamental na-
turalistic impulse, ontological and semantic inquiries are carried out at the same level and by the same 
methods as empirical inquiries in the sciences.  Therefore, no intelligible distinction can be drawn be-
tween methodological and substantive varieties of naturalism. 
This conclusion is important for two reasons.  First, it shows that methodology goes a long way.  
Fixing some methodological beliefs is quite often enough to fix some substantive beliefs as well.  
Second, it shows that calls by metaphysicians to an extra-empirical domain of inquiry are superfluous.  
Our Quinean naturalist does not need “serious metaphysics,” to sort out her substantive commitments.  
2 CARNAP & QUINE:  The Roots of Naturalism and the Fundamental Naturalistic Impulse 
In Quine’s eyes2, Carnap sought to construct the empirical world from sense data, and in so doing, 
to set science on its proper foundation.  Thus, Quine sees Carnap as an heir to Russell:  “Russell had 
talked of deriving the world from experience by logical construction.  Carnap in his Aufbau, undertook 
the task in earnest” (Quine 1970: 41).  It is through this lens that Quine saw Carnap engaged in a project 
of radical reduction of scientific theories, i.e., the project of translating terms or statements from ordi-
nary scientific language as employed by working scientists to “sense-data language.” For Carnap this 
sense-data language consists only of logical notations, including higher-order set theory, and ordered 
                                                          
2
 For the purposes of this explication of Carnap’s work, I will limit myself mainly to Carnap-as-Quine-sees-him.  
The aim of this section is to fix a critical feature of Quine’s naturalistic turn away from Carnap, so any misunders-
tandings inherited from Quine will do no harm. 
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quadruples specifying point-instances of space-time (x; y; z; t) wherein certain qualities reside (Quine 
1951a: 40).  The project of radical reduction is then to show how, by translation, all of our meaningful 
empirical discourse can be reduced to statements of the sense-datum language. 
Radical reduction is foundationalist in two distinct senses, and we can see Quine’s critique of Car-
nap as a response to his foundationalism.3  In the first place, Carnap’s Aufbau project is foundationalist 
in the sense that he sought to provide a foundation for the superstructure of empirical knowledge on 
the basis of immediate sensory experience.  Certain beliefs are basic, such as “red here, now”; from 
these basic beliefs Carnap hopes to derive more familiar ones like “there is an apple in front of me.”  
This aspect of radical reduction’s foundationalism runs parallel to the foundationalism of the logicists’ 
attempted reduction of mathematical knowledge to logical knowledge: for the logicists, logical truths 
were to form the basis on which the superstructure of mathematical knowledge could be erected; simi-
larly, in Carnap’s radical reduction, statements of the sense-data language form the foundation upon 
which the superstructure of empirical knowledge is built.  Secondly, radical reduction is foundationalist 
because it adopts the stance that epistemology, as some extra-scientific theory of knowledge, is needed 
to establish the legitimacy of empirical science.4  Philosophy is therefore in the business of seeking some 
extra-scientific truths, of a different kind or special epistemological status that would ground the prac-
tice of the sciences.5  From this perspective, empirical science cannot justify its knowledge claims by its 
                                                          
3
 See Haack (1993: 338).  We might also speak of Carnap’s foundationalism as a two-level view: that the empirical 
level of the sciences needs justification from some other domain of inquiry. 
4
 Carnap’s radical reduction to a pure sense-data language evinces his commitment to a verificationist theory of 
meaning; see Quine (1954) & (1951).  The diagnostic utility of such a theory is twofold:  first, metaphysical debate 
in philosophy was decried as meaningless, for the propositions under discussion could not be shown to be subject to 
any possible verification; second, and more germane to the present discussion, verificationism and radical reduction 
provided both a vindicative and critical function to the sciences by showing that scientific discourse was meaningful 
or meaningless, respectively.  For Carnap, then, an extra-scientific domain of inquiry (here the Aufbau) is needed to 
secure the path of the sciences, to keep its discourse meaningful and free of metaphysical deviation.  
5
 Radical reduction, as I take it, is primarily interested in purging the sciences of non-sense debates.  Some sen-
tences, even within scientific discourse, are devoid of content if they resist empirical verification in principle.  Phi-
losophy, on this view, is therefore needed to show that scientific enterprise is legitimate because the concepts it em-
ploys are contentful.  Furthermore, reduction of scientific language to sense data language precisely specifies what 
sorts of experiences would count as evidence, and failing any specification of this kind, discourse that fails to speci-
fy how its conjectures might be verified should be abandoned. 
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own methods. Carnapian radical reduction is supposed to give to science what it cannot give to itself: a 
demonstration that its claims, so long as they are translatable into the sense-data language, are indeed 
justified. 
Quine’s critique of radical reduction is twofold.  In the first place he faults Carnap for not adequate-
ly carrying out the task he set before himself.  “Der logische Aufbau der Welt,” Quine tells us,  
does not give translational reduction…. The crucial point comes where Carnap is explain-
ing how to assign sense qualities to positions in physical space and time.  These assign-
ments are to be made in such as way as to fulfill, as well as possible, certain desiderata 
which he states, and with growth of experience the assignments are to be revised to 
suit.  This plan, however illuminating, does not offer any key to translating the sen-
tences of science into terms of observation, logic, and set theory. (1969a: 76-7) 
Carnap has failed to convince Quine that sentences containing physical concepts are adequately trans-
latable into equivalent sentences comprised of only phenomenalistic vocabulary, that is, vocabulary that 
references immediate sensory experience.  Showing how to assign sense-qualities to point-instances of 
space-time does not at the same time show how to reduce physical sentences to their counterparts in 
the sense-data language.  In radical reduction “we want to establish the essential innocence of physical 
concepts, by showing them to be theoretically dispensable” (ibid.).  By failing to provide adequate trans-
lation rules, Carnap has failed in this task. 
But there is a deeper concern.  The above criticism has shown merely that radical reduction had 
not been adequately performed (we might even suspect that, given Quine’s admiration for Carnap, he 
may have felt that if the Aufbau had not managed to pull the project off, then likely nothing else would), 
but this criticism stops short of pointing out an in-principle difficulty with reduction.  Famously, Quine 
gives us this kind of objection in “Two Dogmas of Empiricism” (1951a).  The problem with reduction, we 
are told, is that it relies on the intelligibility of the distinction between statements that are analytic, or 
true in virtue of language, and statements that are synthetic, or true in virtue of the way the world is. 
The central and innovative insight in Quine’s “Two Dogmas” is supposed to be that both dogmas—
analyticity and reduction—are the same.  “The two dogmas” Quine tells us, “are, indeed, at root identic-
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al” (1951a: 41):  if the dogma of reduction holds that a sentence containing theoretical terms can be 
translated into a synonymous sentence of the sense-data language, then analyticity is simply a limiting 
case in which a translated sentence has no observable consequences whatsoever.  In other words, ana-
lytic sentences are confirmed under any circumstances, they hold true “come what may” (ibid.).  The 
contrasting synthetic sentences are confirmable only in the presence of certain kinds of experiences giv-
en by the sense-data translation. That is, synthetic sentences are confirmed by actual instances of their 
empirical content. 
For Quine, the problem with this account of the analytic/synthetic distinction is that it makes no 
sense to speak of a sentence’s “empirical content,” and further that it is foolish to try to seek a boun-
dary between sentences confirmable under any empirical circumstances and sentences confirmable by 
the presence of their empirical content. 6  In the final section of “Two Dogmas” Quine forwards a picture 
of knowledge as “man-made fabric which impinges on experience only along the edges,” in which “no 
particular experiences are linked with any particular statements in the interior of the ﬁeld, except indi-
rectly through considerations of equilibrium, affecting the ﬁeld as a whole.”  An important consequence 
of this view is that any sentence can be confirmed under any empirical circumstances: 
Any statement can be held true come what may, if we make drastic enough adjustments 
elsewhere in the system. Even a statement very close to the periphery can be held true 
in the face of recalcitrant experience by pleading hallucination or by amending certain 
statements of the kind called logical laws. Conversely, by the same token, no statement 
is immune to revision. Revision even of the logical law of the excluded middle has been 
proposed as a means of simplifying quantum mechanics; and what difference is there in 
principle between such a shift and the shift whereby Kepler superseded Ptolemy, or 
Einstein Newton, or Darwin Aristotle? (1951a: 43) 
                                                          
6
 The first four sections of “Two Dogmas” are principally concerned with showing that any plausible notion of ana-
lyticity is hopelessly circular; for example, analyticity might be defined in terms of synonymy, which is explicated 
with the help of analyticity (see Quine (1951a) pp. 20-32).  It is interesting and perhaps worth noting that Quine 
does not give us a reason to think that circularity is in-itself pernicious.  Indeed, some, like David Lewis, do not see 
circularity as the sticking point of Quine’s critique:  “Quine is right that there is a problem about analyticity, but the 
problem is not the circle” (2009: 219n4).  However, even if Quine’s appeals to circularity are not convincing, the 
arguments of the final two sections, recounted above, still go through. 
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If any kind of sentence is revisable, even paradigmatically analytic sentences like logical laws, then draw-
ing a distinction between the analytic and the synthetic based on a sentence’s immunity to empirical 
revision is untenable.  Purported analytic sentences, Quine contends, cannot are not different in kind 
from synthetic ones. 
Quine’s repudiation of the analytic-synthetic distinction is repudiation a fortiori of Carnap’s radi-
cal reduction.  Recall that that radical reduction suggests a way to specify, by translation, the empirical 
circumstances in which a sentence might be confirmed; but Quine’s retort is that any sentence can be 
confirmed under any empirical circumstances.  Therefore, it does not make sense to speak of a sen-
tence’s empirical content or to undertake a reduction project to uncover that empirical content. 
Interestingly, we note that by 1951 (the year “Two Dogmas” was published) Carnap had long 
since abandoned the Aufbau project and had instead devoted himself to what he called the “logic of 
science.”  The significance of Quine’s critique of the analytic-synthetic distinction not only cuts against 
reduction, but also against another project Carnap had “undertook in earnest”—rational reconstruction. 
We saw earlier that logicism influenced Carnap in his project of radical reduction.  We will now 
look at two other influences on this later project of rational reconstruction.7  First, the axiomatization of 
geometry by Hilbert provided a model in which any axiom set is true only in virtue of its consistency.  For 
example, in non-Euclidean geometries, variations of the “parallel postulate” relate to different spaces 
with different properties (either hyperbolic or elliptical) that satisfy the axioms.  The axiomatization of 
geometry demonstrated to Carnap that axioms themselves do not pick out any specific subject matter, 
rather their subject matter is simply whatever set of objects make them come out true.  Axioms are con-
                                                          
7
 For an account of the influences on rational reconstruction, I am following Demopoulos (2007). 
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stitutive of their subject matter.  Thus, we can know that some truths (e.g., geometrical truths) can be 
known for certain a priori.8   
 Secondly, Einstein’s theory of special relativity demonstrated to Carnap that certain principles that 
appear in physical theories are not descriptive, as they might seem to be.  Rather, some prescriptive 
principles are needed for the empirical interpretation of the language of physics.  For example, Einstein 
postulated that “any ray of light moves in the stationary system of co-ordinates with the determined 
velocity c, whether the ray be emitted by a stationary or by a moving body” (this is the second num-
bered principle in §2 of “On the Electrodynamics of Moving Bodies” (1905)).  Even if this postulate is in 
fact empirically confirmed, it nevertheless occupies a special status for Carnap because the postulate is 
crucial to the interpretation of various other physical phenomena like simultaneity or time dilation and 
length-contraction and very high velocities.  
With this background in mind, rational reconstruction is viewed as a project that seeks to diffe-
rentiate clearly the conventional and factual components of language, particularly the language of scien-
tific theories.9  For Carnap, rational reconstruction is carried out as follows:10 
Sentences of a language (say of physics) are sorted into theoretical and observational sentences 
(T- and O-sentences for short).  Each kind of sentence is identifiable according to its primitive vocabu-
lary, i.e., whether the predicates involved are about observable events or about unobservable events.  A 
sentence containing only observational predicates is an O-sentence; a sentence containing only theoret-
ical predicates is a T-sentence.  Sentences containing both O- and T-predicates are called correspon-
                                                          
8
 We here see an indication that the Carnap-as-an-heir-to-Russell reading starts to break down.  The Carnap of ra-
tional reconstruction of scientific language appears more like Kant.  Both are engaged in projects to isolate the con-
stitutive elements of knowledge.  See Maddy (2007 I.5).   
9
 This does not mean that rational reconstruction settles so-called external question, ie., questions that are posed 
independently of a language framework.  Instead, radical reconstruction is a method for distinguishing factual and 
conventional components, given a language framework. 
10
 The following account of rational reconstruction owes much to Demopoulos (2007). 
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dence rules (or C-rules).  These sentences serve as bridging principles linking O- and T-sentences togeth-
er.11    
A theory is then written as a list of the T-sentences and C-Rules (TC): 
  TC(O1,…,On; T1,…,Tn) 
where O1,…,On and T1,…,Tn list the observational and theoretical predicates used in TC.
12 
Next, we can replace the theoretical predicates in TC by existentially quantified variables, writ-
ten as 
  ∃X1,…,∃XnTC(O1,…,On; X1,…,Xn) 
This is known as a Ramsey sentence TC and says that there is an n-tuple that plays the same role in the 
T-sentences and C-rules as the theoretical predicates.  Importantly, Ramsey sentences eliminate the 
theoretical terms of a theory while implying the same observational consequences; i.e., all the same ob-
servational consequences will result whether or not all the theoretical terms in the list TC have been 
substituted by variables.13   
The final phase of rational reconstruction specifies the related Carnap sentence, which has the 
Ramsey sentence of TC as its antecedent and the theoretical postulates and C-rules as its consequent.  It 
is written as: 
  ∃X1,…,∃XnTC(O1,…,On; X1,…,Xn) ⊃ TC(O1,…,On; T1,…,Tn) 
The Carnap sentences says that if any predicates X1,…,Xn satisfy TC , then the predicates specified 
by the theory (TI,…,Tm) do. 
                                                          
11
 For example take the language of physics and the Rutherford experiment.  Some statement concern only observa-
ble events such as “The zinc sulfide sheet was illuminated;” other sentences concern unobservable events like “The 
alpha particle collided with the nucleus;” further, some sentences contain both vocabularies: “When the zinc sulfide 
sheet is illuminated and such-and-such a location, the alpha particle collided with the nucleus.”  These are examples 
of O-sentences, T-sentences, and C-rules, respectively. 
12
 The typographical convention used here is intended to make the terms used in a theory perspicuous.  “TC” 
represents a list of sentences; the parenthetical material lists the predicates used in TC. 
13
 Again, as with radical reduction, Carnap is trying to “establish the essential innocence of physical concepts, by 
showing them to be theoretically dispensable” (Quine 1969a: 76).  
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The point of this whole exercise is to differentiate clearly the conventional and factual components 
of a theory.  The factual component of a theory is represented by its Ramsey sentences, since the Ram-
sey sentences of a theory imply the same observations as the theory itself.  The Carnap sentences are 
supposed to represent the conventional or analytic portions of the theory, since they are observationally 
uninformative (i.e., all of the O-sentences it implies have the status of logical truths).  The analytic com-
ponents of a theory are akin to Hilbertian axioms or Einsteinian prescriptive principles because they are 
constitutive of the subject matter of the theory.  Because the analytic truths are responsible for the in-
terpretation of other sentences of a language, there are at least some truths that can be known a priori. 
For Carnap, the distinction between the conventional and factual components of a theory is 
central to resolving disputes—or rather, for eliminating pseudo-questions—in science and philosophy.  If 
we encounter disagreement concerning the conventional, analytic sentences of a language, for instance 
if there is disagreement over the proposition “space-time is a continuous manifold,” we do not find our-
selves engaged in serious philosophical or scientific debate, rather we find two parties speaking entirely 
different languages at cross-purposes.  This kind of debate attempts to settle external questions, apart 
from any linguistic framework.  Without the requisite interpretive apparatus—i.e., the conventional as-
pects of a language that are provided internal to a theory—such questions are not questions of empiri-
cal fact as they purport to be, but are instead merely questions of convention.  As Carnap puts it: 
If someone wishes to speak in his language about a new kind of entities, he has to intro-
duce a system of new ways of speaking, subject to new rules; we shall call this proce-
dure the construction of a framework for the new entities in question.  And now we 
must distinguish two kinds of existence questions: first questions of the existence of cer-
tain entities of the new kind within the framework; we call them internal questions; and 
second, questions concerning the existence or the reality of the framework itself, called 
external questions….Those who raise the question of the reality of the [framework] itself 
have perhaps in mind not a theoretical question as their formulation seems to suggest, 
but rather a practical question, a matter of practical decision concerning the structure of 
our language.  We have to make the choice whether or not to accept and use the forms 
of expression for the framework in question.  (1950: 242) 
11 
 
The situation is like Euclidean and non-Euclidean geometers debating the parallel postulate—they 
are not seriously considering any substantive positions but are instead championing their respective 
conventional, pragmatically chosen axioms against each other.  They are, literally, speaking different 
languages.  Similarly, debates over the continuity of space-time, perhaps between relativistic and a 
quantum physicists, are not as they appear.  What is actually up for discussion is the pragmatic decision 
to accept or deny a new language; what masquerades as a change of theory is in fact a change of linguis-
tic framework.  Rational reconstruction in the “logic of science” is intended to diagnose this kind of 
pseudo-debate, where pragmatic questions for which there is no matter of fact are unfortunately mista-
ken for questions of fact, squandering the efforts of scientist and philosopher alike. 
Thus, for Carnap the “logic of science” tells us which questions are decided conventionally, ex-
ternal to any particular linguistic framework (e.g., the language of special relativity).  I noted earlier that 
Quine’s repudiation of the analytic/synthetic distinction cuts equally against Carnap’s convention/fact 
distinction.  For a view to this, we turn to Quine himself: 
No more than the distinction between analytic and synthetic is needed in support of 
Carnap’s doctrine that the statements commonly thought of as ontological, viz., state-
ments such as ‘There are physical objects’, ‘There are classes’, ‘There are numbers’, are 
analytic or contradictory given the language.  No more than the distinction between 
analytic and synthetic is needed in support of his doctrine that the statements common-
ly thought of as ontological are proper matters of contention only in the form of linguis-
tic proposals. (1951b: 210) 
Conventional components of language are identifiable for Carnap because they are analytic, i.e., they 
imply no observational consequences.  Such sentences are therefore true or contradictory no matter 
how the world may be; they are true come what may.  Quine denies that there are any sentences of this 
kind.   Every sentence, even purported logical truths are open to revision based on some (however re-
mote) confrontation with experience.  For example, even the law of the excluded middle has come un-
der fire as the results of quantum experiments have proven recalcitrant to our usual conceptual 
schemes.  Denial of the analytic/synthetic distinction is simultaneously a denial of a sharp conven-
12 
 
tion/fact dichotomy and a refusal to recognize the goals of rational reconstruction and the logic of 
science. 
[I]f there is no proper distinction between analytic and synthetic, then no basis at all 
remains for the contrast which Carnap urges between ontological statements and em-
pirical statements of existence.  Ontological questions then end up on par with ques-
tions of natural science. (1951b: 211) 
 
Rational reconstruction thus represented a distinct level of inquiry apart from the empirical sciences.  
From this vantage point, one could keep a watchful eye on the sciences, occasionally stepping in to point 
out that its methods are insufficient.  Here the work of the philosopher (the logician of science) is neces-
sary to keep science tethered to its proper task of deciding questions by experiment, and to not get 
caught up in matters of linguistic dispute.  The trouble is not that scientists ought not engage in the 
pragmatic practice of adopting new frameworks (they surely ought to), but that science errs when it 
makes the mistake of treating linguistic conventions as empirical facts. 
Quine denies that this separate level of inquiry is necessary or even intelligible.  So-called ‘ex-
ternal’ questions, Quine thinks, are decided by exactly the same methods as so called ‘internal’ ques-
tions:  
Our acceptance of an ontology is…similar in principle to our acceptance of a scientific 
theory, say a system of physics: we adopt, at least insofar as we are reasonable, the 
simplest conceptual scheme into which the disordered fragments of raw experience can 
be fitted and arranged.  Our ontology is determined once we have fixed upon the over-
all conceptual scheme which is to accommodate science in the broadest sense; and the 
considerations which determine a reasonable construction of any part of that concep-
tual scheme, for example, the biological or the physical part, are not different in kind 
from the considerations which determine a reasonable construction of the whole. 
(Quine 1948: 16-7)14 
In other words, Quine thinks that the considerations that decide questions at Carnap’s linguistic level are 
exactly those considerations that decide questions at the empirical, scientific level.  Where Carnap 
sought a new level of enquiry distinct from natural science, Quine showed us that this level is really of a 
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 See also, Maddy 2001: 42ff. 
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piece with routine scientific practice.  Rational reconstruction is therefore completely dispensable; we 
need only one level, the level of inquiry of natural science: 
But why all this creative reconstruction, all this make-believe?  The stimulation of his 
sensory receptors is all the evidence anybody has had to go on, ultimately, in arriving at 
his picture of the world.  Why not just see how this construction really proceeds? Why 
not settle for psychology? (Quine 1969a: 75) 
Quine is here urging the abandonment of a two-level view.  If we want to know how our mature 
sciences have delivered us a complicated and detailed picture of the world, what their standards of evi-
dential support are, how they go about constructing and updating hypotheses, how they resolve dis-
putes that seem to outstrip available evidence, how higher-level norms of explanation are introduced 
and developed, etc., we need not appeal to another level to find out; the sciences themselves furnish us 
with the tools for their understanding.  This exhortation embodies the fundamental naturalistic impulse: 
“a resolute skepticism in the face of any ‘higher level’ of inquiry that purports to stand above the level of 
ordinary science,” as Penelope Maddy aptly puts it (2001: 39).  It is this impulse that I take to be abso-
lutely fundamental to naturalism. I intend the fundamental naturalistic impulse to constrain a definition 
of naturalism.  We will see that, even though, this impulse is overtly methodological, its methodological 
component is not exhaustive; some substantive positions are had as a consequence of method. 
3 THE RAILTON-LEITER VIEW OF NATURALISM 
Some recent proponents of naturalism have asserted that it comes in two varieties:  there are 
methodological and substantive naturalistic doctrines. Representatives of this view include Brian Leiter 
(1998) and (2002), and Peter Railton (1989).15   In its methodological mode, naturalism represents a de-
mand that philosophical inquiry be continuous with empirical inquiries carried out by the sciences.  To 
the methodological naturalist, there are not philosophical methods distinct in kind from scientific me-
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 For other examples of this distinction see Forrest (2000), Goldman (1999), and Papineau (2007).  What Leiter calls 
“substantive naturalism” is referred to by others as “philosophical naturalism,” “metaphysical naturalism,” or “onto-
logical naturalism.”  However, the basic distinction is the same:  we may differentiate between a purely methodolog-
ical doctrine of naturalism and some other doctrines that outstrip these bare methodological concerns.     
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thods; while philosophy might differ from the sciences in the nature of its questions (say, by asking 
“fundamental” or “general” questions), it does not differ in its ways of going about answering those 
questions or in the kinds of answers it gives.  On this view, more traditional philosophy falls into error in 
conducting itself as an armchair exercise in conceptual analysis,16 or in supposing that philosophical 
theories of knowledge must first be in place before we are entitled to regard empirical knowledge as 
justified. On this picture, philosophy is continuous with the empirical sciences.   
Leiter, in Nietzsche and Morality, fixes the notion of “continuity” by appeal to the following con-
ditions: 
Results Continuity…requires that philosophical theories—e.g., theories of morality or 
knowledge—be supported or justified by the results of the sciences.  (2002: 4) 
Methods Continuity…demands only that philosophical theories emulate the “methods” 
of inquiry of successful sciences.  (2002: 4) 
Results continuity names the demand that naturalized philosophy must be tethered to the delivered 
results of the sciences.  “[P]hilosophical theories that do not enjoy the support of our best science,” Lei-
ter writes, “are simply bad theories” (2002: 4). For instance, a philosophical theory of mental phenome-
na in terms of spontaneously arising energies would violate the widely accepted conservation law of 
kinetic plus potential energy, a principle that has been employed to good effect in many areas of 
science.  A naturalist bound by Results Continuity would have to reject this theory on the grounds that it 
stands in contradiction to well established scientific results.   
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 This does not mean that analysis has no place in any naturalistic philosophy, but only that the information unco-
vered by such a method is trivial.  As we will see, some versions of the “Canberra Plan” of analysis are acceptable to 
naturalists.  Let’s say some contested theoretical term may be analyzed only in accepted terms of the vocabulary of 
mature sciences, and such an analysis is intended to set the stage for further philosophical enquiry.  For instance, 
quoting from David Brandon-Mitchell, “in the classic case of philosophy of mind we might be able to specify the 
belief role in a Ramsey sentence [e.g., “that there is a unique kind of entity with such-and-such features”; or alterna-
tively, as a corresponding Carnap sentence:  “if there is a unique kind of entity with such-and-such features, then it 
is belief], and then the only allowed move would be to see if there is something in our scientific ontology that plays 
that role (or near enough), in which case we have vindicated beliefs, or else we discover there is no such thing, in 
which case we have discovered that eliminativism about belief is true” (2009: 26).  This kind of analysis would sup-
posedly jibe with many naturalists because the definitive work on whether or not to accept or reject eliminativism 
about belief is perfectly consistent with empirical inquiry, even if the inquiry is framed by the so-called Ramsey 
sentence (for a view against the analyticity of Ramsey sentences, see Papineau (2007)).   
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Just as Results Continuity gives philosophical importance to the results of the sciences, Methods 
Continuity validates the judgments of scientists regarding what they take to be good methods of expla-
nation, rather than calling for an independent philosophical account of explanation.  Leiter remarks that 
“methods” ought to be broadly construed, “ to encompass not only, say, the experimental method (e.g., 
the method of testing progressively refined claims against experience), but also the styles of explanation 
and understanding employed in the sciences” (2002: 4).  For example, to at least some naturalists, like 
Hume and Nietzsche, a commitment to causal explanation is characteristic of the empirical sciences.17  
In this case, Methods Continuity demands causal explanations in accounting for typically “philosophical” 
phenomena, such as belief, knowledge, morality, action, etc.  For the methodological naturalist, “[j]ust 
as we often understand events in the inanimate world by identifying the natural causes that determined 
them, so, too, we understand human beliefs, values, and actions by locating their causal determinates in 
various features of human nature” (2002: 5). 
Another feature of the methods of the empirical sciences that is transmitted to philosophy via 
the methods continuity condition, and one that will play a special role for us in determining the relation-
ship between so-called methodological and substantive naturalism, is a criterion of indirect evidential 
support.  Part of the scientific method (broadly construed) is that hypotheses can garner support indi-
rectly, by enjoying a number of theoretical benefits.  Consequently, rational choices between two theo-
ries that are equally supported by all known evidence can be made by appeal to how much indirect sup-
port is conferred. 
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 To be clear, Leiter in no way intends this characterization to speak to the so-called “Demarcation Problem” be-
tween genuine science and pseudo-science—astrology for instance offers causal explanations.  It is enough for him 
that “there are enough clear cases of science on which to draw for methodological guidance”  (2002: 6n3).  We 
should also keep in mind that contemporary naturalists might reject the idea that natural phenomena have determi-
nate causes, in keeping with scientific developments in some interpretations of quantum theory.  The point is not 
that Methods Continuity requires a commitment to determinate causal explanations full stop (although causal theo-
ries of scientific explanation seem best supported), but rather that philosophical methods are and should be adaptable 
to ever-evolving scientific styles of explanation and understanding.  
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In contrast to methodological naturalism, according to the Leiter-Railton view, naturalism can 
also be substantive. According to Railton,  
[substantive naturalism]…is not in the first instance a view about philosophical methods, 
but about philosophical conclusions.  A substantive naturalist advances a philosophical 
account of some domain of human language or practice that provides an interpretation 
of its central concepts in terms amenable to empirical inquiry. (1989: 156) 
This speaks to what Leiter might call “semantic substantive naturalism.”  He also mentions an ontologi-
cal form of substantive naturalism: “the (ontological) view that the only things that exist are natural (or 
perhaps simply physical) things” (2002: 5).  Historically, ontological naturalism has been the thesis that 
there are no supernatural entities, i.e., entities that somehow stand outside the natural world and can-
not be understood or explained in the same way we understand events in nature.  However, contempo-
rary naturalists are often drawn to another, stronger version of ontological naturalism known as physi-
calism.  Physicalism has been a notoriously under-defined term in contemporary philosophy. Some, like 
Crane and Mellnor (1990), suggest that there is no plausible formulation of the doctrine; others, like 
Pettit (1993) think physicalism is perfectly definable.  For our purposes, we will just stick with Leiter’s 
characterization:  physicalism is “the doctrine that only those properties picked out by the laws of the 
physical sciences are real” (2002: 6 & 1998: 84). 
There is another feature to the Leiter-Railton view of naturalism besides the sharp division be-
tween methodological and substantive naturalism.  In Leiter’s words, “it is important to notice that a 
commitment to [methodological] naturalism does not entail [substantive naturalism]…methodologically, 
it is an open question whether the best philosophical account of morality or mind or knowledge must be 
in substantively naturalistic terms” (2002: 6).  We might call this thesis the “Non-Entailment Thesis.”  
This view states that there is no necessary relationship between methodological naturalism and it subs-
tantive variants. 
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4 METHODOLOGICAL NATURALISM AND SUBSTANTIVE ONTOLOGICAL NATURALISM  
I think that the Non-Entailment Thesis is false.  I believe that methodological naturalism plus an 
inherited world theory does in fact entail a number of substantive conclusions.  In this section, we will 
see how the acceptance of widely-held views in the sciences concerning indirect evidential support inva-
riably leads the methodological naturalist to embrace a substantive ontological position—namely, that 
there are no supernatural entities.   
As we have seen, the fundamental naturalistic impulse gives expression to a number of related 
theses, including Quinean gradualism (the idea that there is no difference in kind between philosophical 
and scientific enquiry) and the related results and methods continuity conditions spelled out by Leiter.  I 
have been urging that this idea is central to naturalism, and is a position that a Leiter-Railton methodo-
logical naturalist would surely accept (under the banner of continuity).  Given that philosophical me-
thods just are scientific methods, a naturalist seems rationally required to accept ontological naturalism 
if our current best-going scientific theories lend their support to the idea that there are no super-natural 
entities or that everything is ultimately physical.  That is, if our best science gives reasons to prefer onto-
logical naturalism, then the naturalist, as a consequence of her methodological stance, should accept 
ontological naturalism.   
In Quine’s debate with Carnap we saw that ontological questions are decidable in exactly the 
same way as scientific ones.  Once we have fixed the conceptual scheme of our best-going, total picture 
of the world, we have thereby fixed our determinations as to what there is.  The relevant passage is 
worth quoting again: 
Our acceptance of an ontology is … similar in principle to our acceptance of a scientific 
theory, say a system of physics: we adopt, at least insofar as we are reasonable, the 
simplest conceptual scheme into which the disordered fragments of raw experience can 
be fitted and arranged.  Our ontology is determined once we have fixed upon the over-
all conceptual scheme which is to accommodate science in the broadest sense; and the 
considerations which determine a reasonable construction of any part of that concep-
tual scheme, for example, the biological or the physical part, are not different in kind 
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from the considerations which determine a reasonable construction of the whole. 
(Quine 1948: 16-7) 
In this passage, we find an apt expression of the fundamental naturalistic impulse:  this time in regard to 
questions that are typically thought of as extra-scientific par excellence.  Ontological investigations, tra-
ditionally conceived, are carried out prior to the workings of the sciences themselves, as a piece of first 
philosophy, to shape and ground scientific practice.  Quine, and the naturalists who follow him (includ-
ing the Railton-Leiter methodological naturalists), see the traditional questions of metaphysics recast as 
scientific ones.  What I think this means is that a commitment to naturalistic methodology does settle 
ontological questions, insofar as these commitments fix our over-all conceptual scheme. 
The fundamental naturalistic impulse, and the methodological naturalism consistent with it, 
wipes out the distinction between philosophical methods and the empirical scientific methods.  This has 
important consequences for the determination of our overall conceptual scheme.  In the first place, this 
means that philosophers use the same standards of explanation, evidential support, and theory choice 
exercised in the empirical sciences.  Important to our current consideration are the well-worn scientific 
ideas that (1) hypotheses can garner support indirectly through coherence with some set of theoretical 
virtues, and that (2) two hypotheses that are equally consistent with all available evidence can be diffe-
rently supported by that evidence.  (1) speaks to the existence of kinds of evidence other than direct 
observation, namely coherence with some set of theoretical virtues; (2) speaks to an appeal to those 
virtues to adjudicate decisions between hypotheses that accord equally well with observation.  Since the 
fundamental naturalistic impulse places ontological questions on a plane with empirical ones, it seems 
that a methodological naturalist should accept ontological naturalism if there is evidence for doing so.   
Quine, in “Posits and Reality,” notes that molecular theory is supported by a convergence of in-
direct evidence (1955: 247ff.); we might expect the same kind of theoretical benefits to count in favor of 
ontological naturalism.  Molecular theory enjoys a number of theoretical benefits that its competitors 
lack:  Quine lists simplicity, familiarity of principle, scope, fecundity, and successful testable conse-
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quences.  It is on the basis of these virtues that physicists find support for the theory, even if it is, ipso 
facto, beyond all direct, observable confirmation.18  The theoretical benefits conferred on the molecular 
doctrine allowed for its acceptance in the case where more traditional, direct forms of evidence are un-
available.  Ontological naturalism is similar in that it is a position somewhat sheltered from confronta-
tion with experience, in the interior of the web of belief (to use a Quinean figure).  It is a kind of high-
level belief that, like other kinds of high-level hypotheses in the sciences, assimilates and organizes a 
whole body of seemingly unrelated and discordant phenomena.  Thus the evidence for ontological natu-
ralism will be very much like the evidence for the molecular theory—it will come only indirectly by virtue 
of its theoretical utility.  Because the methodological naturalist recognizes the sanction of this kind of 
evidence, she will accept ontological naturalism too. 
It will be useful to compare ontological naturalism with another universally accepted doctrine:  
the law of conservation of energy.  The law of conservation of energy states that in all possible physical 
interactions the total quantity of kinetic plus potential energy remains constant.  It is well confirmed 
that energy is conserved in certain cases. For instance, the total amount of energy is maintained in me-
chanical interactions between bodies; Joule’s apparatus clearly demonstrated that the total amount of 
energy is conserved when gravitational potential energy is converted into kinetic energy.  However, the 
conservation law is fully general: kinetic plus potential energy is conserved in any possible type of physi-
cal interaction.  
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 Modern quantum tunneling microscopes do have resolution down to the atomic level, but it is important to note 
that molecular theory gained the upper hand long before molecules were directly observable.  It is an interesting 
question for historians of science to try to identify the tipping point; however, it is a matter of historical fact that 
direct observation is not a necessary condition for accepting a theory.  See Maddy (1997: 135-43) for an interesting 
discussion of the eventual acceptance of atomic theory in the early 20th century. 
Also, note that I am not here arguing in support of Quinean theoretical virtues or a Quinean theory of con-
firmation.  The point, I think, is uncontroversial to philosophers of science:  theoretical benefits, short of direct ob-
servation, do count as evidence in favor of a theory.  
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Like molecular theory, the law of conservation of energy garners overwhelming support from its 
theoretical utility; and like molecular theory, the conservation law, due to its generality, is not amenable 
to direct confirmation.  Seizing on this latter point, Émile Meyerson wrote: 
What really would be a valid experimental demonstration of the conservation of ener-
gy?  We should need a considerable series of experiments showing that through all 
kinds of change, under the most varied conditions, different forms of energy transform 
themselves into one another according to equivalents remaining constant within the 
limits of error of measuring instruments…. It is not even certain that if we were able to 
measure very exactly all the energy known to us, as present in any phenomenon, we 
should find it really constant, and this for the quite simple reason that we are in no way 
sure of knowing all the forms of energy. (quoted in Elkana 1974: 162-3) 
The crucial point here is not that we cannot test to see if energy is conserved in all possible known me-
chanical interactions; this is at least in principle possible, even if it is a daunting task.  The idea is that we 
could never, in principle, come up with a sufficient demonstration of the law of conservation of energy 
because we cannot know if we know all the different forms of energy.  
Yet the law has become a mainstay of modern science; its utility has been proven in many areas 
of research, from astronomy to thermodynamics to relativity.  The law holds quite generally, though a 
consequence of the Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle allows that the law may be violated provided that 
that period of time in which the total energy of a quantum system increases is extremely short.19  But 
this only speaks to the anomalous character of the quantum; we would surely rather, at least for the 
time being, make alterations in other parts of our total theory to account for this possibility than give up 
a long-standing and theoretically rich law. 
I have suggested that the weaker form of ontological naturalism is preferable to the doctrine 
that there are supernatural or non-natural entities or properties on account of its theoretical benefits.  If 
we take up the aforementioned Quinean virtues, we will see its benefits:  the view is simple in that only 
one kind of entity or property is posited; it is familiar because the entities and properties mentioned 
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  Energy-time uncertainty says that uncertainty in energy times uncertainty in time is greater than some very small 
number (Plank’s constant), or: ∆E∆t > h.  This has the consequence that systems may gain energy so long as the 
surplus energy is remains in the system for a time no greater than h/E. 
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play in our best-going scientific picture of the world; it implies a wide array of testable consequences 
(e.g., demonic possession has a natural explanation); the view is fecund for new extensions (e.g., there 
have been attempts to naturalize nearly everything, from epistemology to metaphysics to ethics to legal 
theory); lastly, that testable consequences have turned out well (e.g., supposed supernatural phenome-
na have found a naturalistic explanation).   
The above considerations of the theoretical benefits of ontological naturalism only speak os-
tensibly in favor of anti-supernatualism.  However, this is enough to undermine the Leiter-Railton view 
that methodological naturalism leaves open the question of ontological naturalism.  Given that the na-
turalist’s methods council her to accept what is best supported by the evidence, and that there are dis-
cernable kinds of indirect support, those methods also council a preference towards some form of onto-
logical naturalism.   
Suppose though that a methodological naturalist wished to remain neutral on whether or not 
there were supernatural entities.  To her, there is not enough clear evidence either way, and in situa-
tions that lack clear evidence, she opts to suspend judgment.  Surely, this is within her rational rights as 
there is no logical entailment between methodological and ontological naturalism.  But to say that there 
is a lack of clear evidence suggests that there is a lack of direct, observational evidence.  If it is her max-
im to suspend judgment in all cases in which no direct evidence obtains, then she should likewise sus-
pend judgment about the existence of atoms (or sub-atomic particles), for that supporting evidence is 
also indirect.  Yet we cannot sympathize with this reasoning.  The methodological naturalist is persuaded 
by the methods of the sciences precisely because of their effectiveness—surely the adoption of the 
atomic theory has been responsible for a wide array of rich discovery in the sciences.  Rational adoption 
of such high-level hypotheses surely counts in favor of scientific methods; indeed, the ability of the 
scientific method to adjudicate hypotheses in terms of convergence of indirect evidence—here, theoret-
ical virtue—seems to be a boon of the scientific method itself.  Rejecting the rational acceptability of 
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these kinds of decisions seems to go against scientific methods, and a fortiori against methodological 
naturalism.   
Still it might seem that the question of ontological naturalism is different in kind from molecular 
theory or the law of conservation of energy.  One might object that the latter are empirical hypotheses, 
while ontological naturalism is a metaphysical thesis.  But again, such an objection would not jibe with a 
methodological naturalist who has, consistent with the fundamental naturalistic impulse, eschewed any 
method of inquiry other than the methods of the empirical sciences.  Methodological naturalism is the 
denial that there are questions of a different kind or character from empirical ones.  “Metaphysical” 
questions, whether ontological or semantic, are naturalized by recasting them as empirical questions.  
Where formerly philosophers sought answers to such questions from the armchair, the naturalist will 
reframe such questions as empirical hypotheses, the merits of which are to be weighed in the same way 
as other scientific hypotheses are adjudicated. 
5 METHODOLOGICAL NATURALISM AND SEMANTIC SUBSTANTIVE NATURALISM 
For the Leiter/Railton view, naturalists who arrive at particular conclusions about ontology or se-
mantics are substantive naturalists.  Substantive naturalists “go beyond” methodological naturalism 
(Leiter 2002: 6).  I will here argue that embracing a ‘substantively naturalistic’ conclusion is not distinct 
in any important way from applying the naturalistic approach when investigating the world in which we 
live.  For Leiter, “it is an open question whether the best philosophical account of morality or mind or 
knowledge must be in substantively naturalistic terms” (2002: 6), and with this I do not disagree.  There 
is no sense in which it is an analytic, conceptual truth that methodological naturalism entails substantive 
naturalism.  Indeed, a methodological naturalist might live in a cloister, perhaps never coming to any 
conclusions, as their method does not countenance the effectiveness of armchair philosophizing.  How-
ever, any active inquirer, with naturalistic methods in hand, is lead to some substantive conclusions 
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about the world.  In this section, we will look at two proposed semantic naturalisms: first, Railton’s a 
posteriori reduction of moral terms, and second, the Canberra Plan conceptual analysis of moral proper-
ty terms.20  For both positions, we will see that they are either starkly non-naturalistic, as they are at 
odds with the fundamental naturalistic impulse, or else the “substantive” label is redundant, as it 
doesn’t capture anything over and above methodological naturalism (which, as a matter of course, con-
tains some substantive positions). 
I would like to note that critics of naturalistic ethics should not dismiss either of the following views 
by way of the naturalistic fallacy.  The naturalistic fallacy claims that it is a mistake to infer from descrip-
tive facts to ethical prescriptions.  For instance, from the fact that exercise promotes well-being, one 
cannot infer that exercise is good or ought to be done—this inference, and inferences like these, are 
said to commit the fallacy.  Closely related to the naturalistic fallacy is what has come to be known as 
the “open question argument,” which says that there is no necessary connection between the descrip-
tively given way things are and the ethically given way things are.  Suppose one is given all the descrip-
tive information about exercise, from there it is still an “open question” whether or not exercise is good 
or ought to be done.  This means that one might reasonably enquire into to rightness of an action, even 
after having attained a complete descriptive account of it.  The open question argument provides a rea-
son for thinking that that naturalistic fallacy is a bad inference:  the lack of a necessary connection be-
tween descriptive and ethical accounts of the way things are underwrites the naturalistic fallacy.   
What Railton and Jackson need to do to fend off the naturalistic fallacy, it would seem, is to show 
why the open question argument does not cut against their view.  In the discussion of each view below, 
after characterizing each view, I will briefly point out why they think the open question argument does 
not pose a threat. 
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 This view is also sometimes called “Analytic Moral Functionalism” (see, e.g., Miller 2003: 232ff.).    
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5.1 Railton’s A Posteriori Reduction of Moral Terms 
Railton suggests that moral predicates, such as “right” and “good,” are semantically reducible to 
non-moral terms, and that these non-moral terms are amenable to empirical inquiry.  This naturalistic 
reduction strategy employs the use of reforming definitions.  Reforming definitions revise the content of 
moral judgments—e.g., “X is right” is reformulated to “X is N,” where N is some complex natural proper-
ty.  A natural property is one that figures in scientific explanations; they are “terms of properties or rela-
tions that ‘pull their weight’ within empirical science” (1993: 315).  It is important to note that Railton 
does not have an a priori notion of natural property ready to hand, nor does he claim that “right” or 
other moral predicates are synonymous with some complex of natural properties; rather, in order to 
identify “right” with N it is enough that the initially stipulative identification turns out, a posteriori, to 
play the same explanatory and motivational role as “right.”  Thus his reduction stands in stark contrast 
to another kind of analytic reduction we will soon discuss, typified by Canberra Plan-style analyses of 
moral terms.  That Railton’s reforming definitions of moral terms ultimately face the tribunal of expe-
rience highlights his commitment to the fundamental naturalistic impulse:  Railton, like Quine and the 
abstract naturalistic inquirer under discussion, is skeptical that any level of inquiry apart from the natu-
ral sciences themselves can settle philosophical questions (here questions about moral concepts).21 
Railton views his project of reducing moral terms to natural terms in the same spirit as the scien-
tific reduction of “water” to “H2O.”  In the case of “water,” Railton claims, no suitable a priori analysis 
could show that “water” and “H2O” denote the same stuff; likewise, no suitable a priori analysis of 
“right” could show that it denotes the same property as N, where is a complex natural property.  In both 
cases, the identifying reduction is something that must be found out and, once the reduction is in place, 
must be tested against experience.  That is, the identification of “water” and “H2O” must show itself to 
be explanatorily useful, indeed it must aid in our understanding of what water is.  Similarly, the reduc-
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 We will see later if Railton is able to make good on his commitment to the fundamental naturalistic impulse. 
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tion of “right” to N is also an a posteriori matter:  in order for us to accept the reduction, the identifica-
tion must prove itself explanatorily useful and must aid in our understanding of the concept of “right.” 
Far from an elimination of moral terminology, Railton thinks of his reforming definitions as a vin-
dication of common sense moral language (1989: 161).  The scientific reduction of “water” to “H2O” is 
again his pet example:  that “water” was identified with “H2O” shows us that our concept of water was 
indeed useful all along.  In his words, “The successful reduction of water to H2O reinforces, rather than 
impugns, our sense that there really is water” (1989: 161).  Railton hopes that a successful reduction of 
moral terms to naturalistic terms will be vindicative in the same way.  First, that facts about the natura-
listic reduction base (N) can play a role in an explanation of our experience of morality; secondly, that 
the reduction base are still properties that can motivate people in way familiar to moral properties 
(1993b: 317). 
Let me return briefly to the open question argument.  Recall that the open question argument is 
supposed to demonstrate that no analysis of “right” or any other ethical property in purely descriptive 
terms is adequate.  For even after a descriptive account of something is exhausted, it will always be an 
open question whether that this is good.  To Railton, the open question argument no longer applies.  
Railton’s claim that “right” is identical to some natural complex “N” speaks of a posteriori identity.  Be-
cause the reforming definition does not represent an analytical connection between “right” and “N,” 
there is no presumption that the reforming definition is meant to conceptually close the question of 
whether right is N.  In the face of further empirical evidence we might have to alter or drop the reform-
ing definition.  The open question argument does not cut against Railton’s strain of ethical naturalism 
simply because it does not seek to conceptually close questions about the relationship between descrip-
tive and ethical accounts (conceptually, if something is N, it is an open question whether it is right); 
therefore, the open question argument cannot be used against it (Railton 1989: 155-6).  
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So much for our explication of Railton’s a posteriori reduction of moral terms.  What is of interest 
to our discussion is whether and in what sense this project qualifies as substantively naturalistic in the 
Leiter-Railton taxonomy of naturalistic positions in philosophy.  Recall that substantive naturalism is 
supposed to “go beyond” its methodological counterpart.  If this is true, then we should be able to iden-
tify some part of Railton’s reduction project that outstrips the higher-level explanatory norms of working 
sciences.  If, on the other hand, we find no reason to believe that semantic reduction (vindicative or 
otherwise) represents an alien method to natural science, then we should find no reason to label Rail-
ton’s project “substantive.”   
Railton’s exemplary use of the reduction of “water” to “H2O” brings me to my point:  does it make 
sense to call a methodological naturalist, taking the methods and results of the empirical sciences as her 
guide, who accepts the reduction of “water” to “H2O”  a substantive naturalist?  What is gained by affix-
ing this label?  Can we make sense of a methodological naturalists who, living in the twenty-first cen-
tury, did not accept the reduction of “water” to “H2O” ?  Wouldn’t this person strike us as anti-science 
and therefore anti-naturalistic?  It seems then, that one can be a pure methodological naturalist only if 
one is cloistered away, or else prepared to deny long-standing scientific discoveries.  Such abject denial 
of commonplace scientific knowledge would be more indicative of a thoroughgoing anti-naturalism than 
a pure methodological naturalism. 
Let us consider an abstract naturalistic inquirer.  Our naturalist deeply feels the fundamental na-
turalistic impulse that there are not any more worthwhile methods of investigating our experience of 
the world than the methods of the natural sciences.  To quote Maddy once more: 
[Our naturalist] will ask traditionally philosophical questions about what there is and 
how we know it…she will take perception as a mostly reliable guide to the existence of 
medium-sized physical objects, she will consult her astronomical observation and theo-
ries to weigh the existence of black holes, and she will treat questions of knowledge as 
involving the relations between world—as she understands it in her physics, chemistry, 
optics, geology, and so on—and human beings—as she understands them in her physi-
ology, cognitive science, neuroscience, linguistics, and so on. (2007: 18) 
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Now, suppose our inquirer is asked whether or not she believes that water is H2O.  No doubt she will 
believe that to be true.  When asked why she believes this identification to be true, she may call atten-
tion to Cavendish’s synthesis of water by burning pure hydrogen in 1784, to Nicholson and Carlisle’s dis-
solution of water into hydrogen and oxygen in 1800, to the success of Dalton’s atomic theory, to the 
measure of atomic weights and proportions by Berzelius in 1826.22  All of these experiments and hypo-
theses give credence to the idea that hydrogen and oxygen combine in a 2:1 ratio to form water-like 
fluid, and that the resultant fluid does indeed contain all the properties—potability, density, boiling and 
freezing points, conductivity, etc.—associated with what is normally called “water.”   She will agree with 
Railton that the reduction of water to H2O serves an invaluable explanatory role.  Understanding of its 
chemical composition leads to an enriched understanding of a number of its properties such as surface 
tension, solvency, capillary action, etc.  Considering all the evidence at hand, she agrees that water real-
ly is H2O.  Note that her acceptance of the identification of water with H2O does not depend on any 
higher, extra-scientific semantic principle, nor does it depend on the universal validity of any principle of 
molecular analyzability; though she might accept the latter as an explanatory maxim, her decision to 
accept that water is H2O does not depend on the veracity of this principle, the relevant experimental 
results and gained explanatory virtue are enough.  
Reasons for her cheerful acceptance of a reduction of “water” to “H2O” are, however, not rea-
lized in the case of reducing “right” to “N”.  In the first place she is not presented with a sizable history 
of discourse about N as she is with a history of discourse about H2O.  Second, she knows of no crucial 
experiments that have established that “right” really is just “N,” though she would surely welcome such 
news.  She, like Railton, finds encouragement that “claims about the world which have, historically, been 
deemed by philosophers to be a priori true…have, with distressing regularity, been revised or aban-
doned in the face of emerging scientific theories” (1989: 156).  She would certainly be thrilled to see 
                                                          
22
 See Boynton (1948), pp. 258-79. 
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that what are all-too-often deemed non-natural, moral properties are in fact just complexes of natural 
properties or that so-called analyses of “right” attain there air of quasi-necessity in virtue of a posteriori 
identification.  However, for her to accept such a definitive conclusion, her modesty would have it that 
enough evidence has accrued and that some track record of discourse about “right” being identical to 
“N” has materialized.  As of now, she is certainly excited about the prospects of such a reduction, and 
welcomes advances in empirical moral psychology, neuroscience, cognitive science, and the like; how-
ever, an embrace of an overarching semantic principle with regard to the reducibility of moral property 
terms to complexes of natural terms, as a philosophical conclusion, is far too enthusiastic.  After all, her 
methods demand that there are no distinctly ‘philosophical’ conclusions.  
Accumulations of a posteriori identification of vernacular terms (e.g., water) with technical 
terms (e.g., H2O) give inductive support to the idea that all terms referring to substances reduce to 
terms referring to chemical composition.  Thus, our naturalists may well accept reductionism in this do-
main as a matter of principle, though this principle represents a high-level norm with respect to explana-
tions of substances.  Reducing water to H2O has proved beneficial to our understanding of water; we 
should therefore seek out reductions of other terms in order to better understand the world in which 
we live.  However, it is important to note that the acceptance of this principle is contingent on whether 
reduction projects turn out well.  The acceptance of an overarching semantic principle with respect to 
some domain of language antecedent to any successful reduction cases would be inconsistent with the 
methods of sciences. 
Back to Railton’s reduction of moral terms to natural properties:  we do not seem to have the 
same kinds of successful reduction cases to appeal to.  It therefore seems that the acceptance of a gen-
eral principle—that moral predicates are identifiable with non-moral terms amenable to empirical in-
quiry—happens on a level distinct from the empirical sciences.  This cuts against the fundamental natu-
ralistic impulse to deny the reliability of any other level.  Therefore, this project seems non-naturalistic 
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on my account.  It is a drawback to define naturalism in terms of the methodological/substantive distinc-
tion, because it sets the bar for naturalism too low.  A mere inclination towards explanations that use 
only natural terms will not do, for one might arrive at such a position by divination, or astrology, or coin-
flipping; surely, one would not entertain promoters of those methods as naturalists.  However, if a 
commitment to the fundamental naturalistic impulse is necessary for naturalism, then any methods 
other than scientific methods are akin to chances tosses of a coin.  So Railton’s semantic naturalism will 
win acceptance because successful cases of reduction count in its favor—in which case it is like the re-
duction of “water” to “H2O;” or else the matter is settled on some other level apart from the natural 
sciences—in which case, to the methodological naturalist, it might have just as well been settled by flip-
ping a coin.  So Railton’s naturalism, under my suggested, more narrow account, is either of a piece with 
methodological naturalism or else not naturalistic at all.  If there is no real methodological difference 
between “water is H2O” and “right is N,” as Railton claims (in both cases the identification is discovered 
a posteriori, representing a tolerable revision of “water” and “right,” respectively), then there is likewise 
no real difference in slapping routine scientific reductions (of water, of heat, of lightening, etc.) with the 
‘substantive’ label—and certainly many beliefs of our naturalist would bear that label. 
5.2 “Canberra Plan” Conceptual Analysis of Moral Terms 
I have just laid out my reasons for thinking that Railton’s reduction of moral terms to natural 
terms is either anti-naturalist or substantively naturalist in only a Pickwickian sense—methodologically 
naturalistic inquiry comes to substantive conclusions as a consequence of its methodological commit-
ments.  Calling the acceptance of the reducibility of one domain of language to another “substantive” is 
redundant, considering an adherence to the fundamental naturalistic impulse.  We will now look at 
another candidate substantive ethical naturalism from the Canberra Plan of conceptual analysis by Frank 
Jackson, inspired by David Lewis’ method for defining theoretical terms.  We will see that such a view is 
either decidedly non-naturalistic, because it contravenes the fundamental naturalistic impulse (which I 
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have been urging is central to a focused understanding of “naturalism”), or else it is of a piece with me-
thodological naturalism. 
We have already seen the broad strokes of Lewis’ plan for defining natural terms in our earlier 
treatment of Carnapian rational reconstruction.  Lewis’ proposal to define theoretical terms is essential-
ly a revamping of Carnapian rational reconstruction (e.g., he rejects Carnap’s division of language into its 
theoretical and observational portions (1983: 79, 82).  Jackson in turn revamps the Lewisian proposal in 
hopes of defining moral terms like “right” and “good” in a descriptive, naturalistic vocabulary.23  We can 
see the parallels with Carnapian rational reconstruction in that Canberra Plan analyses likewise dispense 
with problematic vocabulary and prescribe a method for defining what we consider indispensable, but 
nonetheless problematic, terms in a favored, descriptive, and natural vocabulary.  
Jackson’s proposal to identify ethical and descriptive properties goes as follows (1998: 140-1):  Let 
M be a mature folk morality, written as a long conjunction of moral platitudes, with predicates in prop-
erty name form (e.g., “Killing is morally wrong” is rewritten as “Killing has the property of being morally 
wrong”).  Each conjunct of M is a platitude that a competent user of moral terms would have knowledge 
of a priori.  Analogously, we might image a mature folk color theory C, that would contain a long con-
junction of platitudinous sentences that a competent user of color terms would know in virtue of having 
mastered the relevant color concepts (e.g., “The property of being red is what causes objects to appear 
red to in visual experience under standard conditions,” “Red has the property of being more similar to 
orange than to blue”, etc.).  In C, the platitudinous color statements constitute a folk color theory.  Like-
wise, M lists the statements that are constitutive of morality.  We can write M as 
  M(m1,…mn) 
where (m1,…mn) makes explicit the predicates used in M. 
                                                          
23
 The particular innovation here is to extend Lewis’ proposal for defining theoretical terms by analysis of their 
causal-functional role to terms, in this case moral property terms, that are generally held to have no genuine causal 
role.  See Menzies and Price 2009: 183. 
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Next, we may rewrite M as the Ramsey sentence of M by removing moral property terms and 
replacing them with existentially bound variables: 
  ∃x1,…∃xnM(x1,…xn) 
The Ramsey sentence of M says that there are some other things that function in the same way as moral 
terms do in the moral platitudes.  For instance, there is some property that plays the role same role as 
“right” in our moral platitudes.24 
What this account alleges is that there is some necessary conceptual connection between the 
moral property terms routinely employed and some purely descriptive, natural properties.  In this sense, 
we may draw a comparison with Railton’s reduction:  Railton wanted to revise the surface content of 
moral judgments by means of reforming definitions.  When we say, for instance, “that X is right” what 
we really mean is that “X is N” (where N denotes some complex natural property) because “right” is 
identical, a posteriori, to N.  Here, the identity relation between “right” and N was something to be 
found out, not a consequence of any analytic connection between moral predicates and natural ones.  
On the other hand Jackson’s reductionism does claim an analytic connection between moral property 
terms and natural terms.  This connection is revealed through an analysis of the roles played by moral 
property terms in M, and showing that some descriptive properties play exactly the same roles.  
For example, consider the following analysis that says what it means for some action A to be 
right: 
(R) A is right iff (∃x1)… (A has xr & (y1)…(M(y1,…) iff x1 = y1 &…)) 
where ‘xr’ replaced ‘being right’ in M (Jackson 1998: 140-1).  We now have the conditions under which A 
is right:  
                                                          
24
 Jackson modifies the above Ramsey sentence to say that there is a unique realization of M: ∃x1,…∃y1…M(y1,…) 
iff x1 = y1 & x2 = y2…  For our purposes we can disregard whether or not M is multiply realized, for our interest is an 
assay of this brand of conceptual analysis for a naturalist bound to the fundamental naturalistic impulse.  
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[A] is right just if it has the property that plays the rightness role as specified by the 
right-hand side of (R), a property we can be confident is a purely descriptive one, given 
the unrestricted, global, a priori supervenience of the ethical on the descriptive.  (ibid.) 
Our naturalist, who seriously countenances the fundamental naturalistic impulse, will surely balk at the 
claimed a priori supervenience of the ethical on the descriptive—to her supervenience theses are akin 
to the higher-level norms, like the ontological positions discussed in the previous section.  Like conserva-
tion laws, causal principles, mechanism, and physicalism, supervenience principles seem to our natural-
ist to be propositions deeply embedded within the web of belief, insulated from empirical confronta-
tion, but not ultimately immune to revision.  She sees no reason to think of supervenience as different in 
kind from any other explanatory norm, and so will see it in the same light as physicalism—namely, as a 
high-level empirical hypothesis. 
What should our naturalist think of the claim that moral property terms like “right” are analyti-
cally identifiable with descriptive terms that play the same role?  Skeptical against methods that sup-
pose another level of inquiry over and above the empirical sciences, she would wonder whether adjudi-
cation of the modified Ramsey sentence (R), for instance, entangles us in any extra-scientific investiga-
tion.  Jackson makes it quite clear that conceptual analysis is an indispensable method of inquiry quite 
apart from the methods of the sciences.  Conceptual analysis finds its particular utility in setting the 
agenda for further empirical investigation.  If we are interested in giving an account of ethics or mind or 
knowledge, then we had better be sure what we are looking for: 
When bounty hunters go searching, they are searching for a person and not a handbill.  
But they will not get very far if they fail to attend to the representational properties of 
the handbill on the wanted person.  These properties give them their target, or, if you 
like, define the subject of their search.  Likewise, metaphysicians will not get very far … 
in the absence of some conception [of their subject]. (Jackson 1998: 30-1) 
Analysis is in the business of clarifying what we mean by our usual ways of speaking about ethics or 
mind or knowledge, as such it sets the agenda for further investigation, defining the subject.  If we want 
to know what rightness is, we must first spell out what rightness involves, for which conceptual analysis 
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is perfectly suited.  If conceptual analysis is in fact an indispensable supplement to the empirical 
sciences, then the modified Ramsey sentences must be epistemically distinct from the synthetic claims 
encountered in the sciences; indeed, they must be knowable, in some sense, a priori. 
It is exactly this claim that the special status of conceptual analysis rides on.  For Jackson, we 
could not be assured of reductive claims like “Water is H2O” unless we were presented with a demon-
stration that H2O plays the same role as water.  Just what comprises the water-role is purportedly 
knowable a priori, since this role is just the list of reference-fixers for the term “water” and any proposi-
tion of the form “X is the F” is knowable a priori just in case “the F” fixes the referent of X (Jackson 2002: 
161).  Conceptual analysis is therefore in the business of mining definite descriptions of common voca-
bulary and then specifying the connection between terms of one kind to terms of some other kind.  In 
particular, as our discussion of moral property terms has shown, conceptual analysis is interested in 
showing that folk-concepts are reducible to descriptive concepts.  Analysis of the folk concept of morally 
right, under this view, makes explicit the rightness-role and then seeks to find a term in some other, pre-
ferred vocabulary that plays that same role.  It is important to note here that, like Carnap, the concep-
tual analyst is proposing another level on inquiry apart from the level of empirical science.  “Your me-
thods,” he might say to the scientists, “are perfectly in order given your purposes.  However, I want to 
make sure that our investigations don’t founder, that we aren’t looking for a handbill instead of a per-
son, and that we can be confident, in fact certain, that water is H2O or that descriptive properties terms 
play the role of moral property terms.  For this we need serious metaphysics—we need conceptual anal-
ysis.”    
Our naturalist will not feel the pull to this higher level of inquiry.  She will agree that we know 
“water is H2O” to be true because, inter alia, water and H2O play the same role.  However, she is not 
persuaded that conceptual analysis of the folk concept of water is necessary for determining the water-
role.  It is at least an open question for her whether or not reference fixing occurs by definite descrip-
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tion, ostension and baptism or by causal-historical transmission.  Indeed, she may wonder if we need an 
account of reference at all.25  
But let us grant the definite description of the rightness-role, and try to see why conceptual 
analysis is indispensable for determining the truth conditions of the moral property term “right.”  Recall 
that these conditions are given by 
(R) A is right iff (∃x1)… (A has xr & (y1)…(M(y1,…) iff x1 = y1 &…)). 
This will come out as true if and only if A does in fact play the rightness role, meaning that the Ramsey 
sentence of M with respect to “right” is also true.  In other words, (R) will be true if and only if it is the 
case that there is something that plays the same role as “right.”  This claim, to our naturalist, seems to 
say something about the world.  That there is something, some complex of states for instance, that plays 
the role of right does not seem to her to be guaranteed by concepts alone.  To generalize from the 
present case:  the proposition that “There is a such-and-such that plays a distinctive role” strikes her as 
an empirical hypothesis, the truth or falsity of which is not decidable a priori, but rather is a matter of 
experiment.  The suggestion from the Canberra Plan now sounds an as if it is a exhortation to look to our 
preferred, scientific account of the world to see if we can uncover whether or not the property terms 
used there can cover other cases.  When chemistry became a systematic science, it was then up to the 
chemists to demonstrate that their new way of talking about water as H2O does not change the subject.  
Knowing that the water synthesized by burning hydrogen is the same (or near enough) as the water that 
we dip out of a well or as the water that falls from the sky is, our naturalists will insist, pace the analyst, 
a matter of empirical inquiry:  we might smell, taste, boil, freeze, dissolves other substances in, run cur-
rents though each of the samples and conclude that they are in fact the same—that water really is H2O. 
Similarly, if we want an account of ethics or mind or knowledge, we should look to our scientific account 
                                                          
25
 Debate over the need for a philosophical account of reference for scientific practice goes back to Tarski’s seman-
tic theory of truth (1944), which, quite famously, dispensed with reference in assigning truth-values to propositions.  
Hartry Field (1972), also quite famously, disagreed with Tarski, claiming that an account of reference is required.  
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of what the world is really like.  Advancements in the brain sciences invite a great deal of enthusiasm 
about the possibility of integrating moral, mental, and epistemological property terms into our funda-
mental scientific vocabulary, for our naturalist this will be a matter of experiment and not a matter of 
connecting folk concepts, analytically, to concepts of another vocabulary. 
It is unlikely that Jackson would deny the naturalistic interpretation above that confirmation or 
information of Ramsey sentences is an empirical matter.  It is important to note that Jackson is not in 
fundamental disagreement here, as acknowledgement of the a posteriori status of these sentences pro-
vides the way out of the open question argument.  Recall again that the open question argument says 
that no matter how much descriptive information is given about an action, one might still reasonably 
enquire about the rightness of that action.  But this is no objection to Jackson’s account, for the identifi-
cations of ethical properties, like rightness, with descriptive properties are one and all a posteriori.  Be-
cause Jackson makes no attempt to conceptually close the question of whether or not rightness is iden-
tical to some descriptive properties, future evidence may force his to modify or abandon this identifica-
tion, the open question argument is cannot be an objection to his account.  What Jackson does claim on 
behalf of conceptual analysis is that there is a necessary connection, which is also knowable a priori, be-
tween the descriptively given way things are and the ethically given way things are.  What is at issue 
here is called “a priori passage.”  The inference from the ethically given way things are to the descriptive 
way things are is a priori, given that the associated Ramsey sentence comes out true.26  Once it is known 
that some descriptive property plays the same role as some ethical property, there is a further demand 
from proponents of conceptual analysis that that is not enough.  We still need a further account of the 
connections between vocabularies that takes place at the conceptual level.  This is why conceptual anal-
ysis is a two-level view. 
                                                          
26
 See Jackson 1998: 80-3; 2002. 
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The above interpretation of Canberra Plan analyses of moral property terms held fast to a one-
level view.  The modified Ramsey sentences represented empirical hypotheses that are investigated by 
routine scientific methods.  Analyses of folk concepts, from our naturalistic perspective, do not reveal 
anything interesting, guaranteed by concepts alone; they instead seem to suggest hypotheses about the 
roles that moral property terms might play, calling for a look into our current best-going theories to see 
if we might identify something that does in fact play that role.  Once the demand for further analysis is 
rejected, Canberra Plan analyses seem to either be of a piece with methodological naturalism, which 
tells us to look to our preferred scientific account of the world when investigating typically philosophical 
problems, or else it is a call to a higher, extra-scientific domain of inquiry.  We have already seen how 
the fundamental naturalistic impulse would shun appeal to any other methods other than those em-
ployed by the sciences.  Given Quine’s reaction against Carnap, it is especially clear that conceptual 
analysis is anathema to naturalism, as it depends heavily on the partition between sentences that are 
analytic and sentences that are synthetic. 
6 CONSEQUENCES AND CONCLUSIONS 
Debates about the meaning of “naturalism” are, I think, important, especially given the prevalence 
of the term.  Not everyone agrees with this.  David Papineau, for instance, thinks that the meaning of 
“naturalism” is “essentially a terminological matter” (1993: 1).  For him, “the important question is 
which positions are right, not what to call them,” and the proper course, given the nebulous meaning of 
the term “naturalism” is to “address the substantial philosophical issues first, and worry about terminol-
ogy afterward.  Once we have worked out which commitments ought to be upheld by philosophers who 
aspire to ‘naturalism’, then we can agree to use the term accordingly” (ibid.)   
However, it seems clear to me that “naturalism” has become somewhat of an honorific label and I 
think that this result is detrimental.  For we do ourselves and others a disservice if we fly the banner of 
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naturalism while not quite understanding the commitments involved.  At the very least, we often unwit-
tingly equivocate while discussing naturalism, what follows from adopting naturalistic views, and 
whether and how different positions that are often labeled as naturalistic hang together.  To me, the 
work to be done in getting clearer on a definition of naturalism, or at least what is minimally required 
for naturalism, is part and parcel of work on the “substantial philosophical issues;” minimally, a more 
precise vocabulary facilitates fruitful discussion.  We should do everything in our power to deflate no-
tions that have become puffed-up, partisan indicators.  Much recent work has gone into refining the 
definition of “physicalism,” and as a consequence, I think, the whole area of debate has been improved.  
I do not think this work indicates that getting clear on physicalism is “essentially a terminological mat-
ter,” apart from some other investigation into the veracity of our beliefs.   
In section III, I aimed to demonstrate that ontology could be settled by appeal to the very same 
theoretical desiderata that are routinely employed to adjudicate between competing scientific theories.  
This methodological admonition to set “philosophical” concerns on the same level as scientific ones—
qua the fundamental naturalistic impulse—is much more that a stipulative terminological matter.  Far 
from showing merely that only those who cleave to the fundamental naturalistic impulse should be 
called naturalists, I have also shown that acceptance of a methodology fixes some substantive beliefs.  
Here, a question about what naturalism is—a supposedly terminological matter—has revealed the con-
nection between methodological commitments and other beliefs, in this case ontological beliefs.  Thus, 
getting clearer on the central features of naturalism, we have gained some insight about which views 
ought to be upheld: those who espouse philosophical continuity with the empirical sciences ought to 
deny the existence of super-natural entities and they ought to do so for purely methodological reasons. 
Section IV gained a similar result.  Methodological considerations are also able to fix further beliefs 
about semantic reduction.  A look at Railton’s use of reforming definitions (IV (a)) showed that questions 
about the reduction of moral property terms to complexes of natural properties would have to be set-
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tled in the much the same way as terms are reduced in scientific practice.  For instance, reduction of 
“water” to “H2O” grew out of an accumulated background molecular theory, replete with laws of pro-
portional combination of elements, and became justified by a dramatic enlargement of our understand-
ing of the properties of water when considered as a chemical combination.  Macro properties of water, 
such as surface tension and conductivity, became explicable in light of its micro-chemical composition.  
We found the case of reduction of moral property terms like “right” to be of a different sort.  In this case 
we are not presented with an entrenched background theory, nor has treatment of moral properties as 
natural properties lead to a greater understanding of morality in the same way as treating water as H2O 
did.  Naturalists committed to the fundamental naturalistic impulse, should therefore be cautious about 
acceptance of broad semantic doctrines concerning the reducibility of moral property terms to com-
plexes of natural properties, for in this case it appears as if Railton and those who follow him have 
elected to make the semantic decision by some criteria quite apart from the ordinary goings-on of scien-
tific practice.  For in the “water” to “H2O” case, much more was needed than reforming definitions, a 
coherence with well supported molecular theory and a continued demonstration the benefits of chemi-
cal composition were both important in vindicating a change in vocabulary.  With Railton’s proposal, it 
seems that these desiderata have not been satisfied.  Again, far from a mere stipulative suggestion 
about the meaning of “naturalism,” I have tried to show how far methodology reaches.  Something as 
austere as the fundamental naturalistic impulse can go a long way in fixing our sundry beliefs—as we 
have already seen with respect to ontology and Railton’s semantic reduction of moral terms. 
Finally, in section IV (b), I wanted to take a look at another kind of semantic reduction popularized 
by the Canberra Plan of analyzing moral property terms.  Here, conceptual analysis of folk theories of 
morality was supposed to show that moral property terms like “right” are analytically reducible to what 
ever other terms play the same functional role.  The Canberra Plan analysis urges that there is a prior 
investigation at the conceptual level to be carried out before having a look at our best going theory to 
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see if there in fact is such a thing that plays the rightness role.  Conceptual analysis, so it is claimed, is 
necessary in order to set the agenda for scientific research to ensure that we are seeking a person and 
not a handbill.  I have suggested that conceptual analysis is not crucial to scientific practice.  When, for 
instance, “water” was identified with “H2O” what was crucial was that chemists were able to demon-
strate that they had not changed the subject and that our talk of water could be appropriated by all our 
talk of H2O.  This appropriation is justified, again, by general scientific considerations—that it coheres 
nicely within a working background theory and that it fosters greater explanatory power—not because 
of anything about some folk notion of water.  This reading of the Canberra Plan deflates the claim about 
the special status of conceptual analysis; this reading of the Canberra Plan follows directly from the fun-
damental naturalistic impulse.  Again, methodology fixes further beliefs about conceptual analysis. 
I have not merely stipulated that naturalism means first and foremost a commitment to the fun-
damental naturalistic impulse.  Instead, this commitment is part of the history of the term; it comes, so 
to speak, preinstalled.  To understand a term, I think, is to understand the history of its usage.  Quine 
gave powerful expression to the idea that all areas of philosophy are amenable to empirical adjudica-
tion, even those areas, like logic and metaphysics, that seem to be extra-empirical if anything is.  Quine 
suggests that nothing really is.  This is the simple but radical starting point of naturalistic philosophy in 
America, and I cannot understand any usage of term “naturalism” that would dispense with its roots in 
the fundamental naturalistic impulse.  What this means is that recent usage of the term that has focused 
on only the “substantive” naturalistic positions—physicalism or semantic reduction—has found history 
obsolete.  “Naturalism” originally and primary indicates a method of doing philosophy.  It is cavalier to 
use “naturalism” indicate positions that might be gained in any old way, by divination or coin-flips.  
Again, this is not mere stipulation.  To say that naturalism is indicative of a method of doing philosophy 
is to pay due homage to the way in which attempts to naturalize various domains of philosophy, like 
epistemology or metaphysics, was first a revolution of method, not of substance.  However, this does 
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not mean that substantive positions do not follow from methodological considerations coupled with a 
going world theory—as the foregoing sections have shown. 
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